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ABSTRACT: The absence of a “business case” for improving health care quality—evidence that 
those who invest in quality improvement will see a return on investment within a reasonable 
time—is widely acknowledged to be a major obstacle to improving health care in the United 
States. This paper extends the investigation into the causes and possible solutions. Others have 
previously identified obstacles to creating a business case for quality, among them: the failure of the 
current health system to pay for quality; consumers’ inability perceive quality differences; 
displacement of the benefits of quality improvement; and an administrative pricing system that 
does not allow purchasers to pay more for higher-quality care. The authors of this report cite five 
additional root causes: difficulties in changing provider behavior; the primitive state of quality 
measurement; inadequate health care system infrastructure; major legal obstacles; and fiscal 
challenges faced by federal, state, and local government. 
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About the Commonwealth Fund Colloquia on Quality Improvement 
 
The Commonwealth Fund Colloquia on Quality Improvement are aimed at leaders 
in health care interested in developing practical plans for improving the quality of 
U. S. health care. The goals of the series are to identify barriers to quality 
improvement and develop specific recommendations to reduce or eliminate those 
barriers. The colloquia bring together industry leaders representing the major 
stakeholders in the delivery of medical services in the United States, including health 
care purchasers, providers, and insurance organizations. Invited leaders of these 
organizations become members of The Commonwealth Fund Quality Improvement 
Leaders Network, which serves as a sounding board and dissemination route for 
new ideas for improving health care quality. The Massachusetts General Hospital 
Institute for Health Policy hosts the colloquia. 
 
The first colloquium, The Business Case for Quality (Nov. 18–19, 2002), was 
designed to engage health care industry leaders in a discussion of ways to improve 
the ability of health care organizations to generate financial returns on investments 
in quality of care. The colloquium grew out of increasing attention to the problem 
of financing quality improvement activities. The second colloquium, Accelerating 
Information Technology Adoption in Health Care (May 19–20, 2003), 
focused on methods to accelerate the adoption of information technology. This 
colloquium grew out of a widespread view that information technology has been 
poised to transform health care as suggested by several specific examples, but that 
consistent widespread adoption of information technology has been slow because of 
specific barriers. The third colloquium, Overuse of Care as a Quality Problem
(Oct. 10–11, 2003), explored the overuse of health care services, which leads to 
problems of both quality and cost. Participants explored interventions that can 
reduce overuse as well as possible next steps to institute such changes more broadly. 
The fourth and most recent colloquium, Physician Clinical Performance 
Assessment (Jan. 22–23, 2004), addressed the following questions: Should 
physician performance be assessed on an individual or group level? And should the 
results of such clinical assessments be made public? 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The absence of a “business case” for improving the quality of health care—that is, 
evidence that health systems, providers, and others who invest in quality improvement 
will see a return on investment within a reasonable time frame—is widely acknowledged 
to be one of the most important obstacles to improving health care in the United States. 
This paper uses work conducted as part of the Commonwealth Fund Colloquia on 
Quality Improvement* to extend the investigation of the causes of and solutions to this 
problem. In so doing, the paper includes comments on quality provisions of the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. 
 
Root Causes 
Leatherman, Berwick, and colleagues13 have identified the following obstacles to creating 
a business case for quality in the U.S. health care system: 
 
1. The current system fails to pay for quality, while paying for defective care. 
2. Consumers are unable to perceive quality differences. 
3. The benefits of quality improvement are often displaced in time and space. 
4. Administrative pricing prevents consumers and organized purchasers who want to 
pay for higher quality from doing so. 
5. Clinicians do not have access to information about best practices. 
 
The Commonwealth Fund Colloquium process identified an additional five root causes: 
6. Ways of changing provider behavior are not well understood. 
7. The science of quality measurement is still primitive. 
8. The health care system’s infrastructure is inadequate. 
9. There are major legal obstacles. 
10. Governments at all levels are in difficult fiscal shape. 
 
Potential Solutions 
An effort to create a business case for quality has to be strategic, realistic, and organized for 
the long haul. The interventions described in this paper are neither exhaustive nor 
conclusive; they could, however, be the basis of a comprehensive strategy. Taken 
                                                 
* See box on page v for more information about the Colloquia. 
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together, they illustrate the types of immediate, short-term, private, and public actions that 
may start us off in the right direction. 
 
Readers should note that collective action, mediated through nonmarket 
mechanisms, will be required to overcome some obstacles to the business case for quality. 
Currently this is not a popular political message, but it seems almost inescapable. The 
question is whether that collective action can be accomplished voluntarily, in the private 
sector, or whether some governmental involvement will be required. For the writers, it is 
hard to imagine a scenario in which a business case for quality will evolve without some 
involvement of the public sector. Building coalitions to support collective action 
generally, and public action in particular, therefore becomes a priority in moving the 
quality debate forward. 
 
In Colloquia discussions, and in reviewing provisions of the recent Medicare drug 
legislation, the following concrete actions emerged as potentially valuable approaches to 
augmenting the business case for quality. 
 
Private Sector Actions 
• Employers, plans, and consumers must develop local and regional alliances to 
collectively encourage providers to produce and disclose data on quality performance. 
• Employers, plans, and consumers must begin experimenting once again with new 
methods of compensation. These should include risk-sharing arrangements, such as 
capitation, partial capitation, and other approaches, that are specifically designed to 
create a business case for quality. Also important are “gain-sharing” options. Gain 
sharing means that the financial benefits of improved quality are shared by the parties 
whose actions make them possible. Examples might be improving quality through 
avoiding overuse of care or through disease management initiatives that reduce 
hospitalizations and physician visits. 
• Employers must develop long-term partnerships with plans and providers. They must 
avoid the practice of putting contracts out to bid yearly. 
• Employers and plans must be willing to pay more for quality without passing on any 
added short-term costs to consumers and patients. 
• Employers and plans should recognize and reward investments in infrastructure that 
will enhance quality, including clinical information systems and measurable integration 
of clinical services within health care organizations. 
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• Employers should experiment with regional self-insured cooperatives, so that the 
benefits of investments in quality accrue to all employers. 
• Employers, plans, and consumers should vigorously support statutory changes in 
Medicare and public investments that are necessary to create a business case for quality. 
 
Public Sector Actions 
• The federal government should invest heavily in research and development to 
understand the processes of care that can improve outcomes and to improve quality 
measures, the ability to implement them and display them, and the understanding of 
how paying for performance affects quality of care under a variety of circumstances. 
• To realize the many positive initiatives in the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, the Medicare program should: 
o Continue and expand its payment-for-quality demonstration programs. 
o Reinvigorate its Medicare Advantage program by rapidly deploying effective 
risk adjustment and then assuring that plans are fairly compensated. 
Congress should relax statutory provisions that prevent the Medicare program from 
paying for quality and should address legal restrictions that prevent plans from 
selectively contracting with networks of providers based on the quality of care 
supplied. The federal government should experiment with new forms of risk and gain 
sharing in traditional Medicare. 
• The federal government should take the lead in developing a national health 
information infrastructure by providing financial assistance to fiscally challenged 
organizations (especially those serving disadvantaged populations), relaxing fraud and 
abuse statutes that inhibit local alliances between community physicians and hospitals 
for information technology (IT) development (with appropriate protections against 
abuse), and providing adequate resources to the new commission developing standards 
of data definition that can support interoperability between IT systems. 
 
Joint Actions 
• Public and private stakeholders should launch a communications effort to educate the 
public about the problems and opportunities associated with deficiencies in quality of 
care in the United States. 
• Public and private stakeholders should develop ongoing mechanisms for coordinating 
their activities in developing a business case for quality. 
 
 x
The creation of a business case for quality is central to improving the functioning 
of our health care system. It will require the simultaneous, persistent, and steady pursuit of 
many of the strategies listed above, and perhaps others as well. Paradoxically, the successful 
creation of an economic motivation to improve quality will most likely depend on the 
ability of public and private actors to come together in private and public collectives 
motivated not by short-term economics but by a long-term commitment to an improved 
health care system. Making health care function in a businesslike way, therefore, will likely 
require ending business as usual in American health care. 
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THE BUSINESS CASE FOR QUALITY: 
ENDING BUSINESS AS USUAL IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
 
The absence of a business case for quality in the U.S. health care system is now 
widely considered a fundamental obstacle to improving the performance of health care 
services, and thus the health and welfare of Americans.5,9,10,13 Increasingly sophisticated 
analyses have begun to isolate the root causes of this basic and vexing obstacle to quality 
improvement, and to outline potential solutions. As in so many domains of health care 
analysis and policy development, navigating this particular journey from understanding to 
action is challenging and often frustrating. One reason is that the root causes extend wide 
and deep and entwine every health care stakeholder, from patient to physician to insurer 
to our most senior elected leaders. 
 
The question in such circumstances is where to start. In an excellent first step, 
Leatherman et al. began the process of developing concrete initiatives to generate a 
business case for quality.13 The Commonwealth Fund then convened a colloquium, The 
Business Case for Quality, in Boston in November 2002.† This paper extends the 
observations contained in previous work and in so doing draws heavily on contributions 
of attendees at the November 2002 colloquium. The writers focus particularly on 
expanding Leatherman et al.’s discussion of the private and public actions that will be 
necessary to create a convincing business case for quality in the U.S. health care system.13 
Because provisions of the recently enacted Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003 could affect the business case for quality, this report takes these 
new statutory provisions into account. 
 
We start by reviewing, very briefly, the obstacles to the business case for quality, 
emphasizing points that were not explicitly made in the Leatherman paper. Later, we pay 
particular attention to a second-order question: why obstacles are so difficult to overcome. 
This discussion does not always make for pretty reading, but it lays the groundwork for 
realistic proposals that can begin to change the ecology of the quality issue. 
 
Four points are worth making before we proceed. First, we define the business 
case for quality as follows: 
 
A business case for health care improvement exists if the entity that 
invests in the intervention realizes the financial return on 
investment in a reasonable time frame, using a reasonable rate of 
                                                 
† See Appendix on page 18 for a list of Colloquium attendees. 
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discounting. The return may be in bankable dollars, a reduction in 
losses for a given program or population, or avoidable costs. A 
business case might exist if the investing entity believed that it 
could accrue an important indirect effect on organizational function 
and sustainability.13 
 
Second, given the complex set of obstacles to realizing a business case for quality, 
overcoming them will require coordinated, persistent, and simultaneous effort on multiple 
fronts. No single initiative will succeed and solutions will depend on involvement by 
multiple stakeholders.10 
 
Third, the business case issue is in many ways the manifestation of a fundamental 
market failure in the health care system. We can frequently identify an economic case and 
a social case for quality improvement. The monetized benefits of certain quality 
improvement initiatives, summing all effects on all parties, frequently exceed the costs. 
The problem is that the costs and benefits accrue to different parties. The social case is for 
the nonfinancial benefits, such as realizing the professional aspirations of health 
professionals, improving public health, fostering social solidarity, and increasing the pride 
of Americans in their health care system and their society. However, those benefits are not 
captured in the form of a return on investment for the parties that must make the 
investment. 
 
These observations lead to the conclusion that in the domain of quality 
improvement, private actors pursuing their self-interest may not optimize social welfare. It 
follows that collective action—mediated through nonmarket mechanisms—will be 
required to overcome some obstacles. This is not a popular message, politically, but it 
seems almost inescapable. The question is whether collective action can be accomplished 
voluntarily in the private sector or whether some governmental involvement will be 
required. The writers have difficulty imagining a business case for quality evolving 
without some public-sector involvement. To move the debate forward, building coalitions 
to support public action becomes a priority. 
 
ROOT CAUSES 
Previous work has identified five obstacles to creating a business case for quality.13 
 
1. The current system fails to pay for quality, while paying for defective care. 
2. Consumers are unable to perceive quality differences. 
3. The benefits of quality improvement are often displaced in time and space. 
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4. Administrative pricing prevents consumers and organized purchasers who want to 
pay for higher quality from doing so. 
5. Clinicians do not have access to information about best practices. 
 
The following constitute, in our view, other significant obstacles to creating a 
business case for quality: 
 
6. Ways of changing provider behavior are not well understood. An example is 
paying for performance. Generally this means paying providers more if they 
achieve certain measurable goals related to quality of care, for example, keeping a 
diabetic patient’s blood sugars under some target level. This approach is 
particularly relevant in overcoming obstacles number 3 and 4. The problem is that 
we do not know whether or how well it will work and how large and persistent 
incremental payments must be to change provider behavior. 
7. The science of quality measurement is still primitive. Much progress has been 
made, but available metrics are pertinent to only a modest proportion of the work 
providers do and the care consumers receive. A consensus on which measures to 
use is emerging only slowly, and providers face the daunting task of collecting 
different data for different stakeholders. Without effective measures, providers will 
have difficulty taking advantage of a business case for quality (if one exists) and 
consumers, plans, and purchasers will have difficulty deciding whom to reward 
with their business or if higher prices are justified. The lack of effective measures, 
in turn, reflects in part our limited knowledge of what works in health care—a 
deeper and more persistent problem. 
8. The health care system’s infrastructure is inadequate. The most obvious and 
frequently cited example is the absence of suitable information systems. Such 
systems would make it easier to coordinate patient care and quickly, accurately, 
and inexpensively furnish information to consumers about current provider 
performance. The organizational infrastructure of the health care system is also 
deficient.8 
9. There are major legal obstacles. These include statutory prohibitions to Medicare 
paying for quality and recent court decisions upholding the constitutionality of 
state-level “any willing provider” laws. In general terms, such laws specify that 
health plans cannot exclude any physician who is “willing” to participate. 
10. Governments at all levels are in difficult fiscal shape. State governments face serious 
deficits. They are unlikely to make changes in Medicaid—for example, paying for 
performance—because, although the changes may increase quality, they could also 
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increase short-term spending. Federal deficits and new fiscal commitments to 
Medicare (notably, the $400–$500 billion Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003) similarly limit the ability of 
Medicare and other federal programs to embark on quality-of-care improvements 
that do not pay off immediately. (Of course, when their coffers were fuller 
governments were not noticeably more aggressive in pursuing a quality agenda.) 
 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Facing this formidable array of obstacles, efforts to create a business case for quality must 
be strategic and realistic. They must also plan for the long haul. The set of potential 
interventions identified below is neither exhaustive nor conclusive, but it illustrates the 
building blocks upon which a comprehensive strategy may rest and emphasizes some 
immediate short-term private and public actions that may start us off in the right direction. 
As the reader will see, certain potential solutions emerge repeatedly in the context of 
multiple root causes. These deserve high priority in the development of a strategy for 
creating a business case for quality. 
 
The Current System Fails to Pay for Quality, While Paying for Defective Care 
This is, in some ways, the summation of many of the other obstacles. The current system 
fails to pay for quality care, and pays for defective care, because consumers and other 
health care decision makers have trouble distinguishing good from bad quality (obstacle 
number 2). This confusion exists because quality measurement is inadequate (obstacle 
number 7), as is the infrastructure to provide such data (obstacle number 8), and so on. 
Displacement of quality benefits in time and space (obstacle number 3) also contributes. 
 
However, two points are particularly relevant to understanding and overcoming 
this obstacle. First, the failure of the current system to pay for quality reflects many 
conscious and unconscious decisions by many stakeholders. These bespeak a collective 
inattention to quality and a collective lack of will to reward it in our health care system. 
The fact is that only recently (and then among only a health policy elite) has quality of 
care been considered problematic in the United States. Most Americans do not consider it 
a central failing of our health care system.2,4 Without support from the grass roots, private 
and public stakeholders are less likely to make politically difficult decisions that may be 
essential to the business case for quality. Employers may be reluctant to restrict employees’ 
access to physicians who do not perform well on quality indicators. Medicare’s Quality 
Improvement Organizations monitor the quality of care provided to Medicare 
beneficiaries, but although statutory authority permits the program not to pay for 
substandard care it may be reluctant to do so. 
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Creating a business case for quality will depend on cultivating public awareness at 
every level concerning ways in which our health care system could be improved. 
Outlining such a strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, but it deserves careful 
consideration from groups interested in the business case. Federal and local governments, 
private purchasers, academicians and thought leaders, and private philanthropies have to 
take the lead. In certain ways, the lack of public outrage over quality problems is the most 
fundamental problem facing the quality movement. That lack is often the proverbial 
elephant in the room during the innumerable meetings on quality that occur among 
policy elites. 
 
Within existing technical limits, public and private purchasers should be actively 
experimenting with systems to reward quality of care. The results of those experiments 
should be shared rapidly and widely, so that successes can be replicated and pitfalls 
avoided. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Rewarding Results Initiative and new 
demonstration programs on the part of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(including those mandated under the new Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act of 2003) constitute an excellent start but more efforts are needed. 
Rosenthal et al. have reviewed existing experiments with paying for quality, most of 
which have not been systematically catalogued or compared to one another.17 In 
particular, coordinated experiments involving multiple public and private payers and 
purchasers in the same geographic locations are needed. The reason is that individual 
payers and purchasers (with the possible exception of Medicare, which, despite recent 
legislation, faces substantial limits to its statutory authority) often lack the market power to 
affect provider behavior in local areas. Success in overcoming the first root cause of the 
business case failure depends on voluntary collective action in many communities around 
the country. 
 
Consumers Are Unable to Perceive Quality Differences 
To increase consumer activism in choosing high-quality providers, two lines of 
intervention seem necessary as first steps (apart from increasing public awareness of quality 
as a problem). The first is to make more provider performance information available to 
consumers. The second is to make the data understandable and actionable. 
 
Improved public reporting of quality data will, in itself, require multiple 
coordinated initiatives. One is to improve and standardize metrics for quality measurement 
so that consumers can learn them and get accustomed to them. Another initiative will be 
to motivate providers to collect the data and to share it. Prospects for improved public 
reporting have brightened considerably recently because of actions by and new authorities 
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granted to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Prior to the recently enacted 
Medicare drug bill, Medicare was already using statutory reporting requirements and 
claims information to develop national quality data for nursing homes and home health 
agencies. The prescription drug legislation made some increases in hospital payment 
conditional on reporting quality data, which is likely to spur widespread compliance by 
hospitals with Medicare requests for quality data. 
 
For the most part, however, efforts by private payers to obtain quality data on 
non-Medicare populations will require voluntary cooperation from providers, and this in 
turn will require that payers interested in reporting have the market power to persuade 
reluctant providers to cooperate. Employer coalitions have arisen in a number of markets, 
but they are neither numerous nor persistent in their quality reporting initiatives. Here 
again, developing mechanisms and incentives to foster collective action on the part of 
purchasers at the market level will prove critical to creating a business case for quality. An 
important question facing the business community in this regard is how to attract mid-
sized and small employers into business coalitions. 
 
Once data become available, they must be understandable and actionable for the 
end user. Given the complexity of the health care product, achieving this goal is 
particularly difficult and will require both trial and error and systematic research and 
development. Proponents of the business case for quality need to enlist the help of 
psychologists (who understand data display) and public relations experts (who understand 
how to communicate with large numbers of consumers). 
 
Benefits of Quality Improvement Are Often Displaced in Time and Space 
Harry Truman kept a sign on his desk that read The Buck Stops Here. The way our 
health care system is organized, the quality buck keeps moving—everyone passes 
responsibility or accountability to the next party. To make a business case for quality, 
multiple key decision makers must share a stake in the quality of care delivered to patients. 
Several changes in the payment and organization of services would further this goal. 
 
The first is to rehabilitate financial risk sharing and gain sharing among providers. 
When they are at risk of financial losses or may benefit from financial gains, professionals 
and the organizations they work for have a stake in avoiding quality deficiencies that result 
in increased expenditures. In other words, risk sharing provides a mechanism for 
overcoming obstacle 1. Capitation, the ultimate form of risk sharing, was largely 
discredited during the 1990s because it was used almost entirely to contain costs and came 
to be seen as a cause of, rather than solution to, quality deficiencies. There is no question 
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that risk sharing, through capitation and other means, has the potential to cause providers 
to skim healthy patients and to withhold indicated services. However, all forms of 
compensation have risks, and it will be difficult to create a business case without the 
opportunity to let providers share the financial consequences of their decisions in some 
form. 
 
The question is how, concretely, to create a new, responsible, quality-sensitive 
system of financial risk sharing in our 21st-century health care system. A variety of 
experiments should be undertaken, including testing alternative forms of risk sharing 
(including partial capitation14,15), quality-linked payment withholds, and more widespread 
use of capitation at the organizational level (especially for integrated health care systems). 
An important reason to revitalize the part of Medicare that pays risk-sharing entities 
(renamed the Medicare Advantage or MA program under the recent drug bill) is that it 
offers this potential for giving providers and plans a stake in quality outcomes. This argues 
for a bipartisan effort to create the conditions that permit the success of Medicare 
Advantage programs. In turn, this will require continued commitment to effective risk-
adjustment technologies and increases in risk-adjusted payment where these have lagged 
seriously behind health care inflation. Implementing this last recommendation, the 
Medicare prescription drug legislation provides $14 billion in extra payments to private 
plans over the next 10 years. 
 
Even financial risk sharing, however, will not lay the basis for a business case for 
quality if patients move constantly among providers and plans. A variety of changes will be 
needed. One is for purchasers to engage in long-term partnerships with plans and 
providers that include quality-performance goals. Achieving this will require that 
purchasers stop choosing plans solely on the basis of price and cease the practice of putting 
their health care contracts out to bid each year. Another possible way to limit the 
consequences of consumer mobility is to develop mechanisms within markets to share 
responsibility for health care risks and expenses. This might be possible if purchasing 
coalitions self-insure for all their members. In this circumstance, employer 1 gains from 
investing in smoking cessation programs even if the worker who benefits has moved to 
employer 2 when his cancer or heart disease develops. Here again, the value of collective 
action at local and regional levels becomes clear. 
 
Administrative Pricing Prevents Consumers and Organized Purchasers Who 
Want to Pay for Higher Quality from Doing So 
Solutions to this problem depend, as do so many others, on the availability of reliable 
quality data that can be the basis for differential pricing of provider services (see obstacle 6). 
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Even if such information were to become available, however, a variety of specific 
measures would be needed to overcome this obstacle. 
 
First, and most important, private purchasers and payers will have to decide 
whether the best-quality care in a market is part of the basic benefit package or a luxury 
for which consumers will have to bear any added freight. Purchasers and insurers could, 
for example, decide to pay more for quality but pass on any added costs to patients who 
use high-quality providers, either in the form of higher premiums or cost sharing. This 
will be particularly tempting when high-quality providers charge higher prices (a 
characteristic of most economic sectors outside of health care) and where any return on 
investment is delayed in time. Passing the costs of quality on to patients creates the danger, 
of course, that patients with lower incomes would be frozen out of high-quality plans, a 
result that could prove self-defeating for purchasers and insurers in the long run. Another 
possibility is that purchasers will negotiate arrangements in which employees pay less for 
using high-quality providers, without additional compensation for the providers. This 
diminishes any incentive a provider has to invest in quality improvement. It is currently 
the case for General Motors, a founding member of the Leapfrog group. 
 
While all the building blocks for the business case are put in place, perhaps the best 
we can hope for is that high-minded private stakeholders will experiment with charging 
less for (at least no more for) the highest-quality providers in their markets, while also 
paying those providers a premium. Pacificare and other plans are beginning to offer 
products in which high-quality networks are actually priced less. The marketability of 
these products should be assessed quickly and the results discussed widely. 
 
Second, the Medicare and Medicaid programs will have to decide whether and 
how they can modify their administered prices to account for quality. Medicare Advantage 
plans have the freedom to do this now within their own networks of providers. The issue 
arises most directly for traditional Medicare, which currently is statutorily barred from 
paying more for high-quality providers. Medicare is able to do so on a demonstration 
basis, in fact it was mandated to undertake such experiments by the recent drug bill. 
Shortly before the legislation was passed, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
launched a demonstration program in cooperation with hospitals belonging to the Premier 
organization. Medicare agreed to pay more to Premier hospitals that were in the top 20 
percent of institutions in quality performance with respect to five diagnoses. Under the 
new bill, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is required to launch a five-year 
demonstration program that will pay physicians a “per beneficiary amount” when they 
meet specific quality performance standards. There is also provision for grants to physicians 
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to help them cover the costs of acquiring information technology that supports electronic 
prescribing. Nevertheless, even assuming that the necessary data on provider performance 
become available, Medicare does not currently have the authority to change its payment 
practices; the demonstrations are just initial steps in this direction. But Medicare 
authorities should make aggressive use of their existing and new payment options, and 
influential private sector groups should work with Medicare and the Congress to assure 
that demonstrations are translated as rapidly as possible into effective generalized 
authorities. 
 
Clinicians Do Not Have Access to Information About Best Practices 
This is a widely cited problem, and it constitutes the motivation for and frustration of the 
evidence-based medicine movement. Many related issues arise in discussing the failure of 
health professionals to learn and use the newest (or even long-established) medical 
knowledge: clinicians too busy to read; the sheer volume of new medical knowledge;6 the 
biased information disseminated so effectively by drug and device companies; and a 
professional culture that resists efforts to standardize practice through guidelines and 
protocols. 
 
Many empirical studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of multiple 
interventions in getting physicians to practice evidence-based medicine. These include: 
reminder systems;1 academic detailing;18 computerized decision support;7,11 and certain 
learning cooperatives.16 None of these approaches, however, has been deployed widely 
enough to change the behavior of entire health care institutions or the health care system 
as a whole. 
 
At the current time, exponents of evidence-based medicine are increasingly 
putting their eggs in the basket of information technology (IT) development. This 
approach has enormous face validity. An effective health care information infrastructure, 
including the electronic medical record, computerized order entry, and interconnected 
regional health information systems, is one way to get the best relevant information to 
clinicians in real time. Encouraging its development will require several initiatives. 
 
First, purchasers and payers must understand that the implementation of IT systems 
will be a multiyear task with an often-delayed return on what will constitute a substantial 
up-front investment. Therefore, payment-for-quality formulas should reward providers for 
investing in approved IT systems, that is, those that demonstrably change clinician 
behavior. The Bridges to Excellence Program, initiated by General Electric and several 
other purchasers, is experimenting with paying primary care providers more if they have 
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certain information technologies available in their offices,17 and Medicare demonstration 
authorities will support this approach. 
 
Second, public authorities will need to take the lead in setting standards for the 
interoperability of proprietary information systems.12 There is no evidence to date that the 
private market is settling on such standards and substantial reason to doubt that it will. In 
the prescription drug bill, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services set up a commission to help establish standards for interoperability. This is a 
much-needed development, but so far the initiative has not been funded. 
 
Third, the public must invest in undercapitalized providers who will otherwise 
never have the capital to acquire and implement state-of-the-art information systems. This 
is essential to avoid institutionalizing a new form of digital divide in which disenfranchised 
patients depend on low-quality providers because the parent organizations lack state-of-
the-art information systems. 
 
Ways of Changing Provider Behavior Are Not Well Understood 
This point is obviously highly related to the one above, but refers specifically to limits in 
our understanding of how to use economic incentives to improve clinical performance. It 
seems absolutely obvious that paying clinicians and organizations more to do certain things 
or obtain certain objectives will be effective. However, several circumstances could lead to 
counterintuitive results. 
 
First, because valid measures of quality are limited in number, and pertain to only a 
fraction of the work of many clinicians, paying for measurable improvements in quality 
could cause distortions in practice. Clinicians and systems could mobilize to obtain 
measurable objectives while neglecting the unmeasured or unmeasurable. Evaluations of 
payment-for-quality experiments should conscientiously track quality in areas not directly 
rewarded. If problems are detected, it might argue for economic incentives that involve 
global risk sharing unrelated to particular quality measures, accompanied by public 
reporting of quality information. Another approach would be to pay for quality 
infrastructure items (like information technology) that assist with diverse quality goals, 
rather than paying for narrowly defined performance objectives. 
 
Second, some observers believe that paying for performance at the individual level 
is an inherently flawed concept that has produced mixed results at best in other industries.3 
This viewpoint suggests that personal pride, professionalism, and commitment to team 
members motivate individuals more powerfully than economic rewards. Perhaps the best 
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illustration of the power of these noneconomic motivations is the fact that most doctors 
work hard every day to do the right thing, even though they receive no extra financial 
reward for doing so. Instead, professionalism and personal pride motivate their behavior. 
Paying individual clinicians to improve performance may not be as effective as commonly 
supposed, or not as effective as alternative approaches that rely on education, changing 
organizational culture, and the cultivation of teamwork. Supporting this viewpoint is the 
argument that, in fact, the quality of health care increasingly reflects the behavior of 
systems of care, rather than individuals. Therefore, even if payments to individual 
clinicians were successful, this approach would not necessarily be effective in improving 
quality of care in the long run. One implication could be that payment for quality might 
be better aimed at organizations than individuals. Organizations would then be motivated 
to create the internal culture and systems that optimize quality. On the other hand, paying 
individual clinicians for quality improvement may create the resources necessary for them 
to hire other personnel, creating teams essential to quality improvement. To explore these 
issues, experiments with paying for quality should involve strategies that reward both 
individuals and organizations, and within organizations, a variety of approaches to 
rewarding quality-related performance should also be studied. 
 
The Science of Quality Measurement Is Still Primitive 
Imagine the following scenario. After a decade of paying clinicians and/or health care 
organizations for quality performance, researchers discover that in some years 20 percent 
of the hospitals or clinicians they reward actually fall below quality standards, while a 
comparable number who meet those standards go unrecognized. As a result, some of the 
latter are forced to close or merge with other organizations. 
 
This possibility is not in the least far-fetched. Clinicians will instantly recognize it 
as the problem of an imperfect diagnostic test that yields false positives and false negatives. 
In clinical care, the difficulty is addressed by improving the test, by adding different tests to 
improve the precision of diagnosis, and by using other information (from the history, 
physical exam, and other sources). 
 
At the current time, the properties of diagnostic tests for quality performance are 
simply unknown (for the most part), as are the costs and benefits of the virtually inevitable 
false positives and negatives that will result from early application. This is not an excuse for 
inaction. It is quite possible that despite mistakes of this type, measurement and public 
reporting will improve average quality in the short term as clinicians and organizations 
scramble to improve performance, so as to qualify for rewards. Nevertheless, over the 
middle to long term, faulty tests of quality performance will prove demoralizing and 
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undermine any quality measurement system and the business case for quality. Research 
and development is essential to improve quality measures and systems for applying them. 
 
The problem, of course, is that our collective willingness to invest in such research 
and development is threatened by lack of public investment in this activity. Under current 
budgetary circumstances, that willingness to invest is unlikely to materialize without strong 
support from the business, provider, and purchaser community. The expression of such 
support should be a high priority for constituencies interested in quality improvement. 
The Medicare prescription drug bill requests that the Institute of Medicine conduct “an 
evaluation of health care performance measures . . . and options to implement policies that 
align performance with payment under the Medicare Program.” Like most Institute of 
Medicine studies, this one will undoubtedly summarize well the existing knowledge about 
pay-for-performance measures and uncertainties about their use. To resolve those 
uncertainties, however, will require follow-up investment in research and development. 
 
The Health Care System’s Infrastructure Is Inadequate 
Improving the health care infrastructure has been discussed, along with some practical 
approaches to doing so. An additional question is whether we should be reexamining the 
integrated health care system—its vertical and horizontal components—as critical 
organizational infrastructure underlying the business case for quality. 
 
The issue here is whether integration helps to overcome several of the other 
obstacles to creating the business case for quality. Obstacles 3 and 5—time and location 
and clinician access to data—could be susceptible to vertical integration solutions, 
particularly in ambulatory care, inpatient care, rehabilitation, and home health care 
services. Thus, moving patients out of the hospital to be cared for in the community is not 
as economically problematic for a vertically integrated system as it would be for an 
independent hospital. Of course, the ability to capture gains from reducing costs is 
enhanced by organizational risk sharing. 
 
An integrated organization will find it easier to create and support information 
systems. The necessary capital is much more likely to be available to large organizations 
than independent practitioners or small institutions. 
 
After a decade of trial and error, promoting integration and size without 
simultaneously creating enormous waste remains puzzling. The problem here is circular. 
Integration often failed to achieve its goals in performance improvement because the 
market did not reward and motivate costly and difficult efforts to truly integrate services in 
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ways that would improve performance. The question is, what approaches to creating a 
business case for quality will support integration, assuming it will reinforce the goal of 
quality improvement? Here again, a concentration on paying organizations for 
performance, rather than paying individual clinicians and small groups, may prove useful. 
 
This discussion of the potential value of vertically integrated health care (best 
exemplified by such organizations as Kaiser Permanente, other group and staff model 
HMOs, and the Veterans Administration) should not create the impression that such 
models are the only approach to building an infrastructure that supports the business case 
for quality. If they were the only option, the prospects for creating a business case would 
be unhappy, indeed, for vertically integrated health care organizations have not proved 
appealing to large numbers of consumers. Therefore, continuing innovation is necessary to 
develop virtual organizations that work together to internalize the benefits and risks of 
quality improvement. Creating such virtual organizations would require innovative 
contractual relationships in which risks and gains flowing from quality improvements are 
shared among independent purchasers and providers. Let’s say, for example, that as part of 
a disease management initiative a coalition of self-insured purchasers brokered a 
relationship between a local hospital and its admitting physicians in which physicians were 
rewarded for reducing admissions for congestive heart failure (CHF), but the affected 
hospitals were able to use some of the savings for hospital-based elements of the CHF 
program. Efforts to create virtual organizations through such creative measures are also 
needed to spur the business case. 
 
There Are Major Legal Obstacles 
The legal barriers to creating a business case for quality can be divided into two general 
types: those constraining private behavior on the one hand and public behavior on the 
other. In the private area, one of the two outstanding barriers has been addressed in the 
Medicare Modernization Act, and the other remains as a barrier. Fraud and abuse statutes 
under Medicare previously prevented hospitals from providing community physicians with 
information systems on the premise that this could encourage admissions to the hospital in 
question, and would constitute a kickback under federal law. This provision of the law 
was a roadblock to developing a national health information infrastructure, since in many 
communities, hospitals are most likely to have the capital and human resources required to 
create and support information systems. CMS recently issued Phase II of the federal 
physician self-referral law or “Stark Law.” The second phase of the Stark Law regulations 
creates exceptions for technology items or services provided to a physician to enable 
participation in a community-wide health information system. The exception is aimed at 
items that will allow access to patient electronic health care records, general health 
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information, medical alerts, and related information for patients served by community 
providers. With these exceptions, the federal government has removed one of the 
obstacles standing in the way of adoption of electronic health records, CPOE, and a 
national health information infrastructure. 
 
Antitrust exemptions are prone to abuse, so they should be confined to specific 
investments by hospitals in IT, and should depend on the nature and purposes of such IT 
investments. The systems should communicate with information systems at competing 
hospitals, so that physicians can provide care of comparable quality to patients in other 
local health care institutions. The IT investments should be laying the groundwork for 
electronic medical records, ambulatory physician order entry, and computerized decision 
support. It might be wise to confine such exemptions initially to providers participating in 
CMS demonstrations designed to facilitate development of community-wide IT 
infrastructures. 
 
A second constraint on private behavior is the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Kentucky, Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, that, at the state level, upholds any 
willing provider laws. One way to mitigate the effects of this ruling is for plans to include 
all providers, but create classes based on performance standards. The providers that meet 
the standards would receive higher payments and preferred referrals compared to those not 
meeting those standards. 
 
Governments at All Levels Are in Difficult Fiscal Shape 
Solutions to this problem involve large issues of tax and fiscal policy that are beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, the political dimension of such solutions suggests that 
private sector support for public efforts to pay for quality will be essential if the public 
sector is to play its role in supporting a business case for quality. The involvement of the 
public sector, in turn, is critical to the success of private sector efforts, because few plans 
and purchasers have the market power to accomplish the necessary changes. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This review of the root causes of the failure to create a business case for health care quality 
and of some approaches to extirpating those causes suggests the following actions. For 
convenience, we divide these into private, public, and joint initiatives. 
 
In the Private Sector 
• Employers, plans, and consumers must develop local and regional alliances that will, 
collectively, encourage providers to produce and disclose data on quality performance. 
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• Employers, plans, and consumers must begin experimenting once again with new 
methods of compensation. These should include risk-sharing arrangements, such as 
capitation, partial capitation, and other approaches, that are specifically designed to 
create a business case for quality. Also important are gain-sharing options in which 
financial benefits of improved quality are shared among all the contributing parties. 
Avoiding overuse of care or disease management initiatives that reduce hospitalizations 
and physician visits are examples of gain-sharing opportunities. 
• Employers must develop long-term partnerships with plans and providers. They must 
avoid the practice of putting contracts out to bid yearly. 
• Employers and plans must be willing to pay more for quality without passing on any 
added short-term costs to consumers and patients. 
• In paying for quality, employers and plans should recognize and reward investments in 
infrastructure that will enhance quality, including clinical information systems and 
measurable integration of clinical services within health care organizations. 
• Employers should experiment with regional self-insured cooperatives, so that the 
benefits of investments in quality accrue to all employers. 
• Employers, plans, and consumers should vigorously support statutory changes in 
Medicare and public investments that are necessary to create a business case for quality. 
 
In the Public Sector 
• The federal government should invest heavily in research and development. The goal 
is, first, to understand the processes of care that can improve outcomes and to improve 
quality measures. Next is the ability to implement them and display them, and 
understanding how paying for performance affects quality of care under a variety of 
circumstances. 
• Building on the many positive initiatives in the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, the Medicare program should: 
o Continue and expand demonstration programs related to paying for quality. 
o Reinvigorate its Medicare Advantage program by rapidly deploying effective risk 
adjustment and then assuring that plans are fairly compensated. 
Congress should relax statutory provisions that prevent the Medicare program from 
paying for quality. It should also address legal restrictions that prevent plans from using 
quality of care as criteria for selecting provider networks. The federal government 
should experiment with new forms of risk and gain sharing in traditional Medicare. 
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• The federal government should take the lead in developing a national health 
information infrastructure by providing financial assistance to fiscally challenged 
organizations (especially those serving disadvantaged populations) and providing 
adequate resources to the new commission developing standards of data definition that 
can support interoperability between IT systems. 
 
Joint Actions 
• Public and private stakeholders should launch a communications effort to educate the 
public about the problems and opportunities associated with deficiencies in quality of 
care in the United States. 
• Public and private stakeholders should develop ongoing mechanisms for coordinating 
their activities in developing a business case for quality. 
 
 
The creation of a business case for quality is central to improving the functioning 
of our health care system. It will require the simultaneous, persistent, and steady pursuit of 
many of the strategies listed above, and perhaps others. Paradoxically, the successful 
creation of an economic motivation to improve quality will most likely depend on the 
ability of public and private actors to come together in private and public collectives 
motivated not by short-term economics but by a long-term commitment to an improved 
health care system. Making health care function in a businesslike way, therefore, will likely 
require ending business as usual in American health care. 
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